West European Studies

The overall objective of Operation Market Garden was to seize bridges across the Meuse and the Rhine. Seizure of the bridges would allow the Allied armies to outflank the Siegfried line and capture the Ruhr Valley, the industrial district of Germany. The operation made large-scale utilization of airborne units.

After the Allied breakout in France, Gen. Dwight Eisenhower directed US forces to pursue German armies northward. Eisenhower ordered the US first Army to cross the Rhine and the Third Army (under Patton) to cross near Mannheim. Eisenhowers strategy was to push on all fronts and trap German forces northward of the Rhine. Montgomery challenged the strategy, arguing that a single thrust towards the Ruhr district was sufficient to knock Germany out of the war.

The overall purpose of Operation Market Garden was to bypass the Siegfried Line and trap the German 15th Army in Arnhem. Specifically, the objective of the plan was to seize important bridges in the Rhine to allow a major Allied push in the Ruhr district. On September 10, 1944, General Dempsey told Montgomery that there were senior military commanders who opposed the operation. Montgomery argued that British PM Churchill wanted a northern thrust towards the Ruhr district to neutralize V-2 launching sites. Montgomery flew to Brussels to discuss the plan with General Eisenhower. Montgomery forcefully argued for a strong northern thrust. Eisenhower gave Market Garden limited priority (it was part of a broad advance).

The Operation
In the first landings, troops arrived on the drop zones without much opposition. The 82nd Airborne Division and other allied units bypassed the German net and dropped behind enemy lines. On September 17, 1944, Montgomery ordered a general advance in the Arnhem area. The German soon realized the magnitude of the offensive. Wilhelm Bittrich, commander of the 2nd SS Panzer Corps sent reconnaissance units to reinforce the defenses. Other German units flocked to the bridges.

Success
Several bridges between the Eindhoven and Nijmegen areas were seized. The armor and infantry advance destroyed several German units. Some German units were trapped in pockets, completely cut off from communication and supply lines. It seemed that the operation would succeed, against the pessimism of most senior allied commanders.

Failure
German reaction was fast. After the capture of the main road bridge over the Meuse, the allies faced strong resistance from German SS units. In the following battle, only a small force remained to defend the seized bridges. Ground forces failed to relieve German pressure on the area. Ground forces also failed to cross the Rhine in sufficient number.

Factors
Eisenhowers decision to make Market Garden a limited operation proved catastrophic. The airborne units lacked armor and air support. The ground forces were located 50 miles south of the operational target. In short, airborne units would have to hold out for 4 days. Montgomerys over prioritization of the operation also proved catastrophic. He failed to take into account the rate at which German forces react to limited offensives. As a veteran of the North African campaign, he should have known the extent of German preparation.

Initially, the plan supplemented armored units in the capture of the bridges, but was soon abandoned. Airborne units caught in the quagmire of German assault failed to launch effective counter attacks. Thousands of Allied soldiers surrendered to German units in the Arnhem area.