West European Studies

To an observer and participant in events in Renaissance Italy, how was a nation to conduct the very serious business of war, from recruiting an army to leading in it the field To Florence and other city-states, the question was more than academic and an answer reaching back through time was to emerge in the early part of the 16th century.

The Italy of Niccolo Machiavelli was a land divided into principalities or even kingdoms, some stretching far beyond the Italian peninsula in terms of influence and actors on the stage. In many ways, Italy was the in the middle of political, economical, religious and social changes and trends that criss-crossed Europe and could even be felt in the distant lands of Asia and the New World. The primary centers of Italian politics and economics were the  city-states, notably Rome, Milan, Florence, Naples and Venice. Each developed in its own way, with, for example, Rome being drenched in the Churchs power and weight in daily affairs throughout Europe or Venice, whose merchant fleets roamed the known world, collecting in its ports the riches of many lands.

This Italy that Machiavelli lived in was filled with intrigue, a barely-contained chaos where fortunes of men and states could rise or fall in a matter of weeks. Factions were created and disbanded in a frenzy, as power seemed to shift from one group to another. The Church held a supreme position, but the increasing riches of city-states coupled with the rise of kingdoms throughout Europe and the growing awareness of New World opportunities was beginning to weaken the Churchs hold on people, thus weakening its overall power.  In addition, the descent of the Church into political intrigues and military ventures, a pattern now long established by the early 16th century, had soured the Churchs image in many parts of Europe and given rise to open religious questioning, undermining the institutional power the Church had held by itself for centuries.

Countries such as France, Spain, Germany and Switzerland were also playing major roles on Italian soil as they sought to create and expand power bases in the riches of ports and commerce. It was a heady time for lovers of intrigue, courtiers, politicians, merchants of all stripes and military commanders, a time when opportunities to match wits was sharpened by the knowledge that victory was brief and defeat could be permanent.

Machiavelli, best known for his sharp-eyed analysis of the politics of his time as expressed in The Prince, had only one book published during his lifetime. That book, The Art of War, took the form of an analysis of military concerns within a dialogue between four Florentine noblemen and Lord Fabrizio Colonna, as Fabrizio answers questions about the proper form, methods and tactics needed for an army to be raised and managed so it could succeed in their day.

Fabrizio, through Machiavelli, is an open admirer of Roman tactics and organization, using them as the basis for his most excellent army to be created. At the time the book was written, circa 1520, Florence was at or very near the top of its power as the premier Italian city-state, rising through a combination of political, economic and social strategies that nevertheless needed to be defended by military might. However, with most of Italy and a great del of Europe engaged in battles and skirmishes, the need for a robust and effective army was great, even greater in the case of Florence whose rise to prominence would not be any sort of defense against the damages it could suffer if defeated.

Just as The Prince would try to lay the groundwork for a most excellent leader to emerge, so did Machiavelli try to steer the course of developing the army of the present and future for Florence. By basing his armys design on the Romans, Machiavelli is reaching back into antiquity for authority, but also bringing forth the best example of military might the world had ever known. In his mind, that the Romans were able to conquer the known world is sufficient proof that the Roman army was by far the most worthy of being emulated. As Fabrizio says in Book Two

For if their manner of arming had been defective, it was necessary for them to follow one of two courses either when they found one who was better armed than they, not to go on further with the conquest, or that they take up the manner of the foreigner, and leave off theirs and since neither ensued, there follows, what can be easily conjectured, that this method of arming was better than that of anyone else.

Fabrizio begins by discussing why an army is needed and what kind of army one should have, for although it is obvious that an army is for fighting battles and wars, it is also obvious, or should be, that an army has no other function, meaning that the soldier can only be one in war and not in peace. Understanding this, the Romans made sure their citizens did not have to become permanent soldiers, and in this way, long avoided the evils of having armed men engaging in ills and lack of virtue that would ultimately harm society. Thus an army is most certainly a double-edged sword, in fact and function, as its primary role is crucial for the nation to survive, but its very existence can be as big a threat or even a greater one than an armed enemy.

Fabrizio also mentions that no nation should give absolute power to its regent, but they should to their armys commander, because a regent rarely has to make any decisions without consulting and an army commander must do so quite often.

What Fabrizio is telling the Florentines is that they must separate the functions of regent and army commander, for they have different goals the regent is to rule by agreement  and the army commander is to do whats needed to preserve the nation from being defeated. The regent has time to decide and the people have time to respond to the decisions made, but an army commander lacks the time to discuss decisions, and unless the decisions are largely correct, will not have anyone left to discuss what should have been done.

Since the purpose of war is to secure peace, Fabrizio is against permanent soldiers, for they will create problems. He points out how the Romans weakened themselves when Octavius and Tiberius had armed guards (the Praetorian Guards and unarmed citizens, but were strong when the citizens were armed (the traditional army from the people) and soldiers became part of the community after their service.

For this reason, mercenaries are also dangerous, as they are not only prone to being subverted by another higher bidder, but because they lack any connection to the city or nation they serve, thus being a source of problems for the society that hires them. In his day, the Church in Rome had replaced the hired local mercenaries they used for protection with Swiss guards, preferring the disciplined soldiers of a foreign land, a decision that has become a tradition, as the Swiss Guards are still active in their role as guardians of the Vatican.

As for composition of the army in terms of weapons and organization, Fabrizio tells the Florentines he would combine Roman flexibility, armors and organization with Greek arms, in essence creating a 6,000-man army of 3,000 short swords with shields, 2,000 men with pikesspears and 1,000 light cavalry. In modern eyes, this seems like a very small army, but in ancient times, many battles that changed history were fought with armies of 1,000-5,000 men. What Fabrizio is suggesting is a Florentine army that not only is large enough to face the challenges its enemies could throw at it, but also small enough to be affordable, given that the cost of maintaining an army is an enormous drain on the public and private coffers of the nation.  With campaigns largely limited to spring and summer, having too many able-bodied men as soldiers would also threaten the productivity of farms and merchant enterprises, an economic weakening that no city-state or region could long afford.

The use of this army is described by Fabrizio as using mobility to avoid entrapment, the armored soldier capable of better defense, the pikesspears of the Greek phalanx as a defense against larger number of soldiers and cavalry and the three-tiered troop arrangement of the Romans to plug gaps that may occur in the front lines while providing tactical reinforcements where the battle may need them. Emulating the Roman model of troop disposition and combining it with the forward thrusting power of the Greek phalanx is what Fabrizio wants to accomplish, adding reach to the short swords of the legion while providing defensive strength to the phalanxs offensive power.  

Fabrizio indicates that if an army is new, as in being drafted or recruited from scratch, it should seek men from 17 to 40 years of age, but that if it is already established, it should simply seek 17 year olds for new soldiers (Book Three). His reasoning is that a new army needs experience and youth combined, but that a standing army needs only youth to keep it strong. In matters of discipline, the constancy of the army would come from the soldiers themselves and the consistency in methods used by its leaders to train and punish soldiers. By recruiting good men of able body and good disposition, an army could be reach strength quickly and keep it throughout its existence. For the future of Florence and any other city-state or kingdom, the selection of soldiers was thus not a matter of grabbing bodies but of true selection, for a bad army could be more disastrous than not having any.

For Florence, an army such as the one suggested by Fabrizio  would have meant that most of its young men would have to serve in the army at some point in their lives, exactly as in the Roman Empire. What is not mentioned is that the Roman nobility often avoided army service or served only in high command capacity by virtue of having money to buy their way out of service or into command. It could be expected that the Florentine nobility would do the same, although Fabrizio does mention that the way to pay for the army would be to have the same recruiting method the Romans did, where the nobles provided the cavalry and some infantry to support it.

In Book Four, Fabrizio discusses tactics as related to historical Roman battles, such as the need to keep forces concentrated, the power of surprise and the need to speak powerfully to ones troops. By using historical references, Fabrizio is reinforcing his message to the Florentines about the kind of army they can create and who should lead it, for a commander who doesnt grasp tactics and strategies, who cannot see the need to make fast decisions and lacks the power of oratory would find himself leading nothing. This portion is long on history but short on basic principles, serving more as a manual of operations of what worked than a blueprint for what could work in the future, given the changed nature of warfare from the days of the Roman Empire to Renaissance Italy.

Books Five and Six show the Florentines how the army support system should be organized for engaging enemies both seen and unseen, with cavalry as scouts and supplies well-managed within the armys reach. Fabrizio suggests dividing the supplies into quarters, with each quarter being assigned to one-fourth of the army. This method would allow each army division to move quickly and have its own supplies while ensuring that no single attack by the enemy could eliminate all of the armys supplies at once. Given the fractious nature of roads and shipments that characterized Italy in Machiavellis day, not putting all of ones eggs in one basket seems prudent.

In addition, he suggests that the infantry help support the cavalry in camp to reduce the number of retainers the army would need, a Roman feature as well. As for the camps, Fabrizio suggests making an organized armed camp as the best defense an army can have at rest, taking advantage of the terrain rather than submitting to it. he particularly praises the Roman method of erecting camp, with each man assigned a task and a plan followed every time a camp was set up and taken down. The underlying virtues of discipline and forethought allowed the Romans security and enhanced chances of success when their army was in the field. For the Florentines, sending their army out would be just as perilous and following Roman example would help reduce the dangers of surprise attacks and a weakened army.

Book Six also urges the Florentines to be aware that a cornered enemy is a desperate foe and that taking advantage of the enemys mistakes is a key to saving ones soldiers for greater battles. Very little is discussed concerning negotiation, but Fabrizio is focused on war and its management, not so much on the politics that could avoid it.

For the protection of cities, Fabrizio suggests walls high enough for medium-sized artillery to keep the enemy at bay and a ditch inside the walls so that as the walls crumble from artillery attacks, the enemy finds itself facing a ditch made deeper by the piles of rubble they have created (for the rubble would fall outward, away from the ditch.) He also suggests that the ditch be so deep that tunneling beneath it would either strike water or create no clear advantage for the enemy.

For city-states and their vassal cities, sieges were a common tragedy and being able to defend themselves well could mean the difference between destruction and a negotiated peace. The reality of the new power of artillery is see in Fabrizios examples as he talks about recent battles and the larger scale of destruction artillery has created in them. To counter this, he suggests that bigger is better, as in a bigger city is easier to defend than a smaller one because it has more positions the defenders can fall back to and bigger defenses better than small ones because they can sustain greater damage and afford more protection.

Fabrizio discusses the use of guile and awareness to keep besieged cities safe or to overthrow them, with more care needed when the enemy is distant than when he is near, for a nearby enemy is easily watched. He praises the constancy and valor of the Romans who never once tried to seek peace from Hannibal, though the Carthaginian defeated them several times and showed  himself to be a true threat to Rome.

In this Book Seven, Fabrizio is providing the Florentine nobles with hard advice about protecting their cities and villages, but also telling them that arms and walls and artillery are not enough if will and courage are not also present. In a day of almost constant battles and skirmishes between enemies, whether it be squadrons of cavalry or armies in the field, the need for preparation, careful thought and decisive action was the key to retaining what one had and conquering the enemy. Fabrizio stresses leadership as a vital component of an armys success and that it is the armys courage and fearlessness that will help it defeat the enemy.

In Fabrizio, Machiavelli created a voice for his ideas on how war should be handled. Unlike the other two best-known works on war, Sun Tzus The Art of War and Claude von Clausewitzs On War, Machiavelli had no direct experience as a soldier, so his insights are not profound or innovative in terms of military thought, thus his work on war is not really studied by military students in our day. It was more a political work than a military one and its lesson is fairly clear to the mind of nations leader war is to be considered very carefully, prepared for with diligence, managed with great skill and exploited with clear thought. In all of these aspects, the Romans had much to teach and much worth emulating. Given the stakes at play in the Italy that Machiavelli lived and worked in, doing less was a path to failure and even death.