West European Studies

FALKLAND WAR

The Falkland War did not do much in changing the course of British defense policy during the 1980s. However, it offered important lessons concerning the need to respond to the contingent circumstances of an unpredictable world beyond the institutionalized situations. Literature on Falkland War focusing on the development of operational capabilities, defense planning, organizational culture and jointery is enormous even though there is very minimal objective analysis. This owes to the fact that there is little critical systematic analysis of the Falkland Campaign particularly with regard to these aspects. This paper is an attempt to refocus on these issues through examining  United Kingdoms side of the conflict with the aim of discovering the fundamental lessons that were learnt from the conflict especially with regard to joint capability and if these lessons were successfully incorporated British defense policy during the 1980s.

In order to satisfactorily perform this task, this paper outlines the development of operational capabilities, defense planning, organizational culture and jointery of United Kingdoms military before the war. It will then proceed to an analysis of the specific structures that were adopted during the war. Within this analysis, there are two areas that will be of special interest inter-service cooperation and joint operations. These dimensions are particularly important in discovering the errors that accompanied the campaign and their future implications for defense policy.
Basically, defense policy is centered on command and control. Even though it also has other equally important dimensions, exploring the implications of Falkland conflict requires a background check on the structure and system of command and control within the British defense.  According to Pimlott, command is the direction, co-ordination and effective use of military force while control is the management of command. Their effective operation depends on the defense policy which further depends on the actual defense circumstances.  The two aspects are critical since they constitute direction at the highest possible level which is important in the realization of unity of purpose. This is further integrated with delegation of authority down to the lowest possible level that is also important in the effective use of forces.

Contemporary strategy has a dimension that is to some extent significant even though impossible to quantify. According to Freedman, this aspect can be summarized using the word legitimacy. The British Government was aware of the issue of legitimacy throughout the Falklands campaign. It hardly tried to make a strong case with regard to economic or strategic interests.  Rather, it focused on the islanders self-determination, unacceptability of force as a means of conflict resolution, the essential right of self defense instituted under article 51 of the UN Charter and the importance of not rewarding aggression. In its claim to foreign governments, emphasis was placed on the example that other nations would derive from the success of Argentinean occupation instead of United Kingdoms critical interests. In this regard, there is need to highlight magnitude of the conflict in order to point out specific lessons.

This paper will adopt a holistic approach on the subject in order to analyze the conflict in all its dimensions. On a narrow perspective, the paper will investigate how the war and its outcome influenced command and control in the levels of strategic and operation. Therefore, its concern is the system of command and control from the level of grand strategy, military strategy, and finally to the operational level which is fundamentally the main focus. Providing clarity on these issues is also held to be important in the successful analysis of the Falkland Campaign. The campaign involved the use and directing of both national and military resources which fall under various categories. The use of national resources in advancing national policy objectives falls under grand strategy of which military strategy is a component. Military strategy involves the employment of military resources in the realization of these national policy objectives. Operational level on the other hand involves directing military resources to realize the end state. As such, it is involved with the planning and execution of major operations. The tactical level which comes after the operational level is concerned with the planning and fighting of the actual engagement.

The role of the various systems and structures in shaping the component capabilities and joint conduct on operations will be explained in this paper. Of equal importance are their implications for future operations. In this regard, this paper provides a critical analysis of Falkland campaign in relation to command and control in an attempt to unearth the important lessons that can be learned from the operation.

Background British control and command system
Britain has had an operational Committee of Imperial Defense since 1904. This committee was overshadowed by the War Council during the World War I then later, the war cabinet that had varying degrees of military advice. According to Sheffield and Talley, the interaction between the military and politics remained a weak point in Britains war effort until about 1918. The Chiefs of Staff Committee was created during the period between the First and the Second World War. It was composed of three heads of Service of which one served as the chair. The three chiefs were not only represented in cabinet but also carried out their normal duties in separate ministries. There were three parallel command chains worldwide with each command chain having area commander-in-chief. Some form of training existed for joint operation even though there was minimal development of amphibious equipment that went further than prototypes. There was provision of joint command even though its necessity was not acknowledged.

    The Chiefs of Staff Committee together with the War Cabinet was mandated with the management of the grand strategic and military strategic levels of Britain with the onset of the Second World War. During this period of time, the British and French forces were put in combined command. The advances of Germany during 1940 however dissolved these structures with the newly elected Prime Minister, Winston Churchill, appointing himself the Minister of Defense. Even though the War Cabinet system went on with its operations and functions, the Prime Minister at times attempted to take the role of the joint commander at the strategic level. This he did with support from the Chiefs of Staff. The three different chains of command were however maintained. A close collaboration between the three separate chains of command was generally realized. A good example is the close collaboration between the Western Approaches Command and No. 15 Group RAF Coastal Command in Liverpool from 1941. The first joint commander of Britain was appointed in 1940. All the RAF forces and Army in the Far East were under his control. The Navy however remained a separate entity. 

The first joint and combined command was established on January 5, 1942. It was referred to as ABDA Command and was made up of United States, Britain, Netherlands and Australia. Lord Wavell became its first Supreme Commander. He was answerable to the Anglo-American Combined chiefs of Staff. The advance by the Japanese swept aside this command and once again, Britain went back to the tri-service system. The remainder of the war however saw the British forces gradually yielding to the pressure from United States to come under joint and combined commands.  The Britains Chief of Staff favored a model in which the coordination of component commanders was to be carried out by the joint commanders instead of exercising a strong centralized command. It was only at the highest regional level that unified command existed. Parallel command chains on the other hand maintained its cooperation at operational level.

    After the Second World War, Britain once again adopted parallel commands. Within this model, commanders became members of regional British Defense Coordinating Committees. The appointment of joint commanders was only done for specific operations. Joint commanders were established once again one and half decades after the Second World War. The move was largely influenced by Lord Mountbatten who strongly believed in joint system especially following his experiences in south East Asia in 1943 and 1946 as the Supreme Allied Commander. The implication is that a two star joint force Director of Operation answerable to a joint four-star regional commander was involved in the 1963-1966 Indonesian Confrontation. The joint four-star regional commander was in turn directly answerable to Chief of Staff. By the early 1970s, the worldwide system collapsed due to financial pressures as opposed to operational pressures. With the withdrawal of British forces to concentrate on NATO tasks, joint commands lost their relevance due to the fact that NATO increasingly absorbed command and control.

    The joint command structures of the 1960s mirrored domestic reforms that took place within the Ministry of Defense. The Service Ministries were in the end absorbed into the Ministry of Defense in 1964. The Chief of Staff was from 1955 being chaired by separate Chief of the Defense Staff. The Britains forces were by the early 1980s following single Service command structures based domestically and combined NATO commands. They became more inclined towards combined regional scenarios in their composition and focus which was strengthened by the defense review of 1981. A high level training facility, the only one of its kind dedicated to joint warfare, was announced closed by the review. Non-NATO contingencies were to be handled by any single Service headquarters that seemed most relevant, making use of the forces that were generally assigned to NATO. The basic assumption was that such kinds of operations were likely to be combined or small scale.

    The general perception was that the Falkland War had its roots in the 1981 review. This was because it encouraged the perceptions of Argentine concerning the possibility of military response by the British. However, there is another review that was less obvious but nevertheless had a remarkable impact on the conflict. Sir Terrence Lewin, Admiral of the Fleet, was not satisfied with his role during the review process. His position restricted him to acting as a COS agent, a position that frustrated him. In order to reinforce the role of CDS, he proposed a number of reforms which made the CDS the senior military advisor to the government. In this new capacity, CDS was not to be restricted in its role by collective responsibility as the chair of COS. Instead, the COS was then to function as his senior advisor. In January 1982, the CDSs replacement by COS as the bridge between grand strategic and military strategic took effect even though COS right to unabated access to the Prime Minister was retained. In this regard, command chains collective responsibility became restricted to the Cabinet level.

The Crisis
In instilling a sense of legitimacy on the actions of the United Kingdom, the United Nations Security Council played a critical role while other declarations by other governments and economic sanctions gave credence to the view that the actions of Britain was representative of international interest. Even though this issue if far from the subject matter of this paper, it reflects various dimensions of British defense policy and its relation with the international community. With the fighting becoming more intense, the matter inevitably shifted from the justification of the cause of Britain to the means that it adopted in the name of this cause. According to the just war principle, a war must be conducted not only to correct a wrong, but the employed means must also be proportionate. This traditional argument is not straightforward. Any employment of armed force must take into consideration a notional relation to the ends but also the means that is available to the opponent.

It is will be interesting to explore how Britain considered the issue of proportion in the conflict.  Another important question that emerged is when it could be said that the principles at stake had been honored. For instance, was it enough to remove the Argentineans from the island Outside the United Kingdom, there was an increased urge to obtain a negotiated agreement in the fastest time possible. In United Kingdom, however, the need was to see honor satisfied regardless of whether Argentineans was damaged. One is therefore compelled to ask how the inclusion of the consequences of the action was to be integrated in the calculation. What was the price of success with regard to military capacity, political goodwill and resources Beyond this, to what extent would it have mattered if the costs were being subjected to those indirectly involved In short, what was to be learned from the conflict and to what extent were they incorporated in defense policy.

The 1982 Falkland Crisis was an indication of tension that had been gathering since the 1960s. The government of Britain had put into consideration military counter-measures to any aggression exuded by Argentine that extends beyond the Royal Marines present in the islands and the Ice Patrol Ship. There were various options that were tabled in papers endorsed by COS presented in February 1976 and November 1977. Among the possibilities was the attempt to reclaim the island after Argentine occupation which was exactly what the government of Britain did.

Lessons learnt from the Falkland War
There are numerous reasons that make the Falkland conflict an interesting subject of analysis. It was a rare opportunity for the performance of a system of weapons in actual combat. Since the Second World War, there had not been any large scale naval encounter such as the one that occurred during the war which witnessed the use of modern weaponry. For the first time, homing torpedoes, air to surface antiship missiles and a wide array of advanced weapon system and devices were used. It was also during the Falkland War that a large scale amphibious assault was conducted under a strong enemy air threat. Even though the war was little, it generated interest and excitement that can only be rivaled by the Iraq war. Before the Argentineans surrendered, there was the urgency to highlight the tactical, strategic and technological lessons.

Strategic specialists and military pundits had much work to do during the conflict. For the first time ever, the Western fleet was faced with massive air opposition. Beside other elements, the war was of military innovation. For Britain, the Falkland War offered some important lessons ranging from tactical, military, strategic and technological. The lessons can be placed under three broad categories manpower, hardware and operations. The war also provided an important framework for analyzing foreign and defense policy. One of the fundamental analytical tasks is to pick out from the general and predictable aspects the important variables that are unique to this war.

The war was an opportunity for machines, manpower, and concepts to be tested, something that training exercises or simulations could not provide. Argentineans had to learn difficult lessons about the importance professionalism, tactics and strategy in military manpower. Britain on the other hand learned about the value of jointery, force structure and hardware. It also resulted in important awareness of broader politico-military lessons concerning the importance of aligning instruments of national power with those of political dictates of commitment to international community.
The utility of the lessons that were learned from the conflict is only meaningful within the context of strategy. Lessons that relate with the structure of force, military hardware and tactics can only be processed in strategic environment. The concerns of a number of politicians and some military planners who have short term military budgets have overrode the commitment to long term strategy. The establishment of capabilities in the absence of direction from military and politics has the potential of disastrous outcomes. Therefore, the role of strategy is to change a states total capabilities into policy instruments. It is strategy that informs military planners on what they need to create.
The war provided a chance for techniques and tactics to be tested apart from offering a means of analyzing the professional competency of the forces that took part in the conflict. It was during the conflict that the first major western navy came under heavy air attack at sea since the Second World War. It was also the first time for a successful attack to be carried out by nuclear-powered hunter killer submarine on enemy surface units. The capacity of the British army was also tested during the conflict. In other words, the conflict provided good grounds for testing the ability of a modern medium sized navy to carry out long range and extended operations under attack from a relatively sophisticated enemy. The outcome also highlighted Britains claim that forces specially devoted to NATO contingencies in Europe could manage to meet defense needs outside the NATO area. The victory of Britain was dependent upon its capacity to gain considerable sea control to enable the landing force to be put ashore and to offer it the much needed support for subsequent land campaign. The threat that would have been posed by the surface fleet of Argentina had been neutralized earlier in the conflict.

    There was not much threat for the British sea control except from the Argentine aircraft. Again, there was threat emanating from the Exocet anti-ship missiles that could be launched by air. The Falkland War resulted in much discovery concerning individual weapons performance and the various kinds of command structures. It also brought into surface the relevance of peace-time training and tactical analysis. This paper is concerned with the question of whether there were lessons learnt during the Falkland War that could guide or guided defense policy at a more basic level.

    It is often the norm to interpret any conflict in terms of pointers to a particular decisive trend in contemporary warfare. For instance, showing that a classification of weapon in gaining more popular usage or is on ascendancy. The war was a confirmation of suspicions about the safety of surface fleet. It clearly suggested the exposure of surface fleet to almost every conceivable kind of air attack. Making excessive generalization about the Falkland experience may however be not a wise move. There are numerous geographical factors, terrain and climate and a myriad of variations of qualities and abilities for one to make a confident statement. The damages cannot entirely be attributed to the use of advanced weapons. Rather, gravity bombs and machine guns made much contribution in the resulting damages. Technical edge was of great importance only when it came to handling the most lethal equipment of modern offense such as SSNs and aircrafts having standoff ground attack missile. The sinking of General Belgrano by use of torpedoes demonstrated the incapacity of Argentine Navy especially when facing hunter-killer submarines. The British demonstrated their capacity in handling aircraft even though they were lacking in detection. This in itself was enough to evade disaster though not sufficient to avoid casualties.

    However, the most interesting lessons are derived from the importance of various factors such as location, climate and terrain. The human factor is also another important factor that proved decisive. According to Freedman, it is a reminder not to get overawed by lists of forces claiming to represent a military balance or by laws which dictate the proper ratios of attacking to defending forces if the former is to succeed. The war was a clear testimony of what can be realized through proper training, tactical ingenuity and physical stamina. Looked at from this perspective, the Falkland war did not introduce a new era in warfare.

    According to Freedman, no reason exists to suggest that the Falkland War set a new pattern at the grand strategy level. However, the way that the campaign was handled represented a change in the pattern of British campaigns during the time. The main issue in the war concerned territory and therefore not vital interests. As such, it was rather an issue of national interest as much as allies came in to help. During the war, civilians posed problems only during the final moments of the war even though not to the levels that had been thought. For both Britain and Argentina, there were to be limits to the war because the survival of either nation was not at stake coupled with the geography. Argentina was not in a position to deploy more men neither could they supply more equipment into the battle since it has reached the limit of its air range. Britain on the other hand was even in a far worse situation because of the range and the task force that was available. As such, the war could not have been prolonged.

    In this regard, Britain had to fight the war alone since it was her interests that were involved. Again, since the war was essentially restricted, it had the capacity to fight it alone. This aspect supports the position that a nation must always be prepared for unexpected events since there is a high likelihood of trouble emanating from any quarter.

    The Falkland war can provide sufficient grounds for arguing against the Defense Review of 1981. The position against the 1981 Review was not founded on the fear about unexpected events but was rather based on an analysis of the threat posed by the Soviet Union.  Britain saw the expansion of the Soviet Unions Navy to be a direct threat not only to the supply routes of NATO across the Atlantic but also the critical oil routes from Middle East to the West. In this regard, it was preoccupied with the Indian Ocean instead of the South Atlantic.  This translates to its preoccupation with the Soviet Union rather than Argentina. Britain was concerned with more holistic threats rather than threats posed by to it alone.

    This position is not however supported by the Falkland War. The move by Argentineans elicited quick reaction from Britain. This raises questions as to whether the Arabian situation could be handled in the same way to keep oil flowing. This has implications for requirements for the force.  The role of the Navy in conducting the South Atlantic campaign would not necessarily be replicated in other conflicts. The Falkland war still left various concerns about the vulnerability of surface fleet. With a few exceptions, the Argentine Air Force did not make adequate preparations for anti-ship operations. However, they managed some hits by relying on the bravery of the pilots.

    The debate concerning the equilibrium of Britains military capabilities was opened up by the Falkland War. This rattled the financial background about the debate. However, the war itself did not offer any justification for changing the direction that the British defense policy had taken. This does not imply that there are no reasons for implementing such a change.

Falkland war lessons and 1980s defense policy 
After the Second World War, the interests and responsibilities of Britain around the globe still remained intact. The protection of interests around the globe meant that Britain had to maintain her forces beyond Europe and to support rulers that she deemed friendly. She also ensured that there was stability during the process of decolonization which proved to be a difficult affair. However, threats from other nations, especially the Soviet Union, became the main defense policy of Britain. In an unlikely move, the peacetime conscription was retained by Britain after 1945. The Royal Navy saw preparation for a possible war with the Soviet in the Atlantic as its priority focus. In this regard, expeditionary capabilities were not considered as of much importance. The consequence of this approach became clear when the British forces failed to mount a rapid response during the Suez Canal crisis in 1956.

    The crisis made Britain to institute moves aimed at improving its expeditionary capabilities. The end of conscription was announced by the 1957 defense review with new emphasis being place on the use of nuclear weapons for peace maintenance in Europe and overseas. The expeditionary role was embraced by the Royal Navy with much enthusiasm since there was remote possibility of conventional wars in Europe. In the succeeding years, new capabilities were established founded on modern amphibious task group reinforced by air craft carriers, replenishment ships, cruisers and a range of escorts.

The background and history of United Kingdoms defense policy is characterized by the conscious attempt to reconcile their commitment to a perceived responsibility and resources. They have at times managed to realize this reconciliation but have never managed to make it last. The need for more sophisticated equipment price increases the budget of defense. The economy on the other fails to grow at the same rate with military demands. For the problem to be adequately managed there was need for the British government to reduce the forces or to make provisions that facilitate the growth of defense spending at a rate faster than the overall economy. These methods have been adopted by the current British government. Despite the generous allocation for defense, there has still been the need to make difficult decisions on defense priorities.

The operation of the review of 1981 Britains defense program and budget resulted in the publication of a white paper entitled The United Kingdom Defense Program The Way Forward. The emergence of this paper was accompanied by several months of heated discussions and criticisms coming from members of the larger defense community. The defense community was barely prepared for the reshaping plans that were proposed by the new defense secretary. The proposals composed of new and a widely different approach to the defense dilemma that faced Britain. Plans for continuing with re-equipment, force level and structure were put under scrutiny by the new defense secretary. The plans instituted provisions for one minor and four major roles that the government determined to execute. The essential characteristics of these roles included maintaining a strategic nuclear retaliatory capacity that then were being provided by a force of four SSBNs providing forces for defending Britains base modernization and maintenance of the main contributions to the ready forces of NATO for maritime warfare in Eastern Atlantic modernization and maintenance of the national contribution to the ground and tactical air forces of NATO for campaigns in the area of Allied Command and modest provision for commitments outside NATO.

    The programs meant for sustaining these roles experienced serious difficulty owing to worsening economic situation. Nott intended to disintegrate the existing defense program and carefully analyze the components and finally reassemble the parts in a way that could make the entire system more effective and dynamic. In other words, Nott attempted to boldly and creatively reshape Britains defense policy. At the backstage of this exercise was the important issue of effective capability or sustaining power for a medium power like Britain. Nott in effect managed to fish out some of the outstanding disproportionalities essential in Britains defense plans. Having done this, he went ahead to restructure the program. The exercise was astute financially apart from being strategically compelling.

    The need to contain the Trident nuclear missile program cost over the next 15 years was central to the Review. The Trident program was central to the debate that followed the release of the Review. Nott was convinced about the importance of the decision to purchase Trident to replace the now aging Polaris fleet in the 1990s. The Trident system was incorporated in the new Review as its foundation. It also suggested the need for immediate cost cutting. The defense secretary also believed that there was need to take into consideration the next decade in order to assess the requirements for future defense as a foundation for commitments to be instituted now. This look forward strategy was put into operation in some major projects which included the Tornado multirole combat aircraft, the Royal Navys antisubmarine carriers, the Nimrod early-warning aircraft, the Rapier air defense missile and the final stage of the development of Chevaline.

    Beside what emerged as a reshaping exercise with regard to commitments and cuts, it appeared as if it was the Navy that was on the receiving end of Notts stab. However, a close examination reveals otherwise. The move to reduce the fleets nominal size was not to be interpreted as an end in itself but rather as a means. It was better to have fewer vessels afloat and keep them in operational readiness than to have many on an inventory listing. The Review aimed at putting into use an operational surface fleet that was small but better equipped as far as the naval outfit was concerned. The cuts could also be viewed in terms of a wider strategic framework. Capabilities for power projections on the high seas were sacrificed in favor of deterrence on the central Front.

    Other positive developments were also spelt out by the defense secretary when he unveiled the Review. Among these were a move to increase defense spending over the next four years, increasing air-to-air missile stock, ordering AV-8B advanced Harriers and new improvements on Chieftain and Challenger tanks. The defense secretarys reshaping exercise also highlighted the problems related to resource constraints and the urgent need for structural adjustments to the whole defense program. It exposed the questionable assumptions and judgments characteristic in the naval plans and a number of outstanding disproportionalities ingrained in them.

    Britains defense policy was now being driven technologically. Within this context, the results comprised a reshaping exercise that demanded structural changes in hardware and software. The Review also highlighted the Eurocentric nature of Britains policy. Commitment to the continent was seen as critical to Britains security. However, reduced economic circumstances do not necessarily need to drive a restructuring exercise. This need must necessarily emanate from strategy. It seems as if this is what happened in 1981.

    No sooner had the exercise been finalized than Argentineans invaded Falkland. The event placed Notts reforms on severe strain but also put into test the assumptions behind his strategy. Before the invasion, Falkland Island was accorded extremely less priority in British defense plans. This is mainly attributed to strategic considerations than budgetary constraints. The 1981 Review gave priority to NATO commitments and also defined the provisions that were necessary in meeting these commitments. The provisions demanded for a restructuring of maritime assets among other things. The largely held belief was that it was necessary to restructure naval capabilities if Britain was to cope with Soviet Unions threat.

    The high priority given to British NATO commitments was reinforced by the mild environment of the South Atlantic. There was no urgency in beefing up defense capabilities in that region. The South Atlantic defense dimension of British defense policy must be seen against this background. South Atlantic received much attention and was elevated to a region of much strategic importance with the Argentinean invasion. This change in British defense policy as shown by the move to recapture Falkland Island was more indicative of the systematic changes that had occurred. The force and magnitude of changes suggested strategic importance inherent in the formulation of defense policy of Britain.

The Falkland experience furthered a revisionist criticism of the British government policy. According to the policy, there must be a way of preserving the surface fleet. Depending on the side that one belongs, there are those who advocate for this to be done by maximizing defense planning while others see that the only way that it can be done is by doing away with Trident. The Secretary of Defense had insisted on maintaining the government policys broad strategic thrust during the Falklands War. He went ahead to publish a Defense White Paper which did not take into consideration the events that occurred in April, May and June.  The paper was mainly composed of a detailed definition of established policy. Regardless of this move, numerous reasons point to the fact that the Falkland War had important consequences for the British defense policy despite the changes instituted in the broad strategic thrust.

    Falkland was by far sharp and short apart from having unique and clear political and military aspects. The war gave an unlikely opportunity for testing tactics and equipment in actual combat situation. Britains defense policy was also put on the spotlight especially with regard to its need to conduct long range expeditionary operation that cannot be reached by land based air cover. There were arguments from various corners in support of capabilities outside NATO. Britains policy before the Falkland War depended on forces that were mainly devoted to NATO contingencies for out of area capabilities. As such, there was no special military capability that was preserved for operations outside Europe. This contrasts with the current British defense policy where much emphasis is laid on expeditionary forces that are capable of operating from a wide range.

Before April 1982, Britains defense policy corresponded with the NATO orthodoxy by emphasizing on land and air forces able to stop a conventional invasion of Western Germany, reinforced with nuclear deterrent. In this regard, the most outstanding characteristic of the Falkland War was the fact that it was fought outside the NATO area with the campaign being led by the Royal Navy. It was a kind of war that Britain had the least preparation. In an epoch characterized by deterrence, there would be grave mistake if one was to be involved in a war that he was most planning for. However, the surprise nature of the Falkland War and the dependence on the service that the government was planning to dissolve inevitably resulted in accusations of strategic shortsightedness from various quarters. The war came as a timely lesson before the senior service was completely rendered incapable of handling such eventualities. This in itself resulted in the reformulation of defense policies to accommodate such surprises.

Both Britain and Argentina did not expect the war and therefore had to improvise their armed forces to deal with situation that they were not designed to handle. Within this circumstance, the status of command and control were raised with the influence of flexibility and quality becoming very important. It may be said that the Falkland War, however limited its impacts were on force posture and fundamentals of strategy, had some form of a delayed aftershock impact on the defense policy of Britain in driving it towards a direction of expeditionary and away operations.  This policy was the brainchild of CDS Field Marshal Bramall who unambiguously stated the link between his work and the Falklands War.